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RECENT DECISIONS

PARTIES - WHETHER ACTION FOR MONEY JUDGMENT BY HOLDER OF
UNSECURED BoNDs CoNsTITUTEs "CLASS" SuIT BINDING ·oN Ar.L OWNERS
OF THAT SERIES WHO Dm NoT APPEAR -The Chicag9 Board 0f Education
had issued a certain series of refunding bonds; and later def.!ulted on interest coupons, numbered 16, attached to the bonds. Prior to the present suit a suit in
equity had been instituted against the board by some of the owners of these bonds,
on behalf of themselves and all other owners of bonds in this series, in which
they prayed for judgment for the amount of interest due to each owner, together with costs, and attorney's fees. Defendant made a motion , to dismiss
that suit on the ground that such action could not be maintained as a class.suit,
but the motion was denied. The Newberry Library, plaintiff in the present suit,
though an owner of bonds in the same series, did not appear as party to the
prior suit. While the prior suit was still pending, the Newberry Library brought
the present action at law and sought judgment on the coupons, m'-mbered I 6,
attached to bonds of the same series owned by it. The defendant filed ~ motion
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in the nature of a plea in abatement on the theory that the library was by representation a party to the equity suit, and there was therefore another suit pending
between the pr:esent parties on the same cause of action. Held, an action to recover interest on certain bonds brought by the owner thereof in behalf of himself and all other owners of bonds of the same series is not a proper "class" or
"representative" suit; and a decree in· such an action would not be res judicata
as to bond owners who did not join. Newberry Library v. Board of Education
of City of Chicago, (Ill. 1944) 55 N.E. (2d) 147.
.
It is a well-settled doctrine that one is not bound by a judgment in personam if he has neither been made a party by service of process, nor has appeared as
party to the suit. 1 Any enforcement of a judgment so obtained would not be
"due process" under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,2 but an apparent
exception exists in the case of a "class" or "representative" suit.8 In judicial
opinions there has been a lack of precision or uniformity as to the requirements
for such a suit. 4 Generally, one or more may conduct or defend the litigation
3.nd the judgment will be binding on all members of the class represented only
" (I) where the question is one of a common or general interest • • • ( 2) where
the parties form a voluntary association for public or private purposes, and those,
who sue, or defen·d, may fairly be presumed to represent the rights and interests
of the whole; (3) where the parties are very numerous and though they have,
or may have, separate and distinct interests; yet it is impracticable to bring
them all before the Court." 5 But it must appear that the interest of the parties
· not present was similar to and consistent with the interest of those who conducted the suit, and, if it may be said that the latter fairly represented the former, the court will proceed to a decree binding on all members of the class.6
The law of the forum determines the necessary requirements of a class suit and
who constitute the class.7 The Fourteenth A~endment does not require a state
1 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877); I FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS, 5th ed.,
§ 407 (1925).
2 Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Newport, 247 U.S. 464, 38 S. Ct. 566 (i917);
Old Wayne Mutual Life Assn. v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8, 27 S. Ct. 236 (1907).
8 Reasons advanced for allowing class suits have been (I) to prevent failure of
justice, (2) to prevent multiplicity of suits, and (3) as a matter of convenience. For
citations see, Wheaton, "Representative Suits Involving Numerous Litigants," 9 CoRN.
L. Q. 399 at 401 (1934).
4 See Blume, "The 'Common Questions' Principle in the Code Provision for Representative Suits," 30 MICH. L. REv. 878 ( I 93 2); Wheaton, "Representative Suits
Involving Numerous Litigants," 19 CoRN. L. Q. (399 1934).
·
5 STORY, EQUITY PLEADING, 2d ed., § 97 ( I 840) ; see also, Smith v. Swormstedt,
_
16 How. (57 U.S.) 288 (1853); Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Barber, 245 U.S. 146, 38
S. Ct. 54 '(1917); Christopher v. Brusselback, 302 U.S. 500, 58 S. Ct. 350 (1938);
Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 41 St. Ct. 338 (1921); I FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS, 5th ed., §§ 435, 436 (1925).
6 Cockburn v. Thompson, 16 Ves. Jr. 321, 33 Eng. Rep. 1005 (1809); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 61 S. Ct. 115 (1940); Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v.
Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921); Smith v. Swormstedt, 16 How. (57 U.S.) 288
(1853); STORY, EQUITY PLEADING, 2d ed.,§ 97 (1840).
7 Bigelow v. Old_Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. I I 1, 32
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to adopt any special rule or formula for determining when there has been a
sufficient representation to make the judgment, order, or decree conclusive as
to all members of the class. As long as it can be said that the procedure adopted
insutles adequate protection of the interests of the absent parties, the "due process"
rule has been complied with. 8 In the principal case the court held that this condition was not satisfied unless there was "a common or joint interest, not only
in the question involved but likewise interest in common in the remedy and
subject matter of the suit itself." 9 The writer's searches.have revealed no cases
where a holder of unsecured bonds was permitted to· bring a representative suit
thereon when the remedy sought was only a money judgment• .Separate and .
distinct money claims of various kinds arising in different situ~tions have
been rejected as a basis for class suits.10 The courts have ordinarily permitted
class suits only where, in addition to the common questions of law ana fact, there
is sought also a common remedy,11 or the parties have a common interest in.
S. Ct. 641 (1912); CoNFLICTS RESTATEMENT, § 450, comment d. (1934); GoonRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 553 (1938).
8 Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 17 S.' Ct. 581 {1897);
Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 6_o S. Ct. 321 (1939).
9 Principal case at 153. See also, Scott v. Donald; 165 U.S. 107, 17 S. Ct. 26~
{1897); Spear v. Gre'ene Co., 246 Mass. 259, 140 N. E. 795 (1923) .• ·For a discussion· of community of interest, which is essential, see 132 A.L.R. 749 (1941).
10 In 'Garfein v. Stiglitz, 260 Ky. 430, 86 S.W. (2d) 155 (1935), plaintiff and
many others had made overpayment for auto licenses. Plainfrff sought money judgment
on behalf of himself and all the others who had made this overpayment. The court
held separate distinct claims were not enough; that in cases permitting representative
suits " ••• there seems to have been a tangible something in which the many persons
had the necessary common or general interest, as a trust fund, an insolvent estate, liens
on the same designated property ••.•" {p. 43 2).
In Smith v. Sparks Milling Co.~ 219 Ind. 576, 39 N. E. (2d) 125 (1942), plaintiff paid, as part of the price in a contract with defendant, the processing tax levied
under the AAA. Many others had made contracts with the defendant in exactly the
same form. The court denied his right to bring a representative suit to recover back
the money for himself and the others.
·
Pemberton v. Board of Education, 67 Ohio App. 175, 36 N. E. (2d) 170 (1940)
involved separate and distinct clarms against a school district for unpaid sa1aries.
Spear v. H. V. Greene Co., 246 Mass. 259 (1923) was a suit by forty persons
representing 60,000 stockholders who had been defrauded. "Mere commuµity of interest in the questions of law or of fact at issue in a controversy or in the kind of relief
to be afforded does not go far enough to warrant a class suit. Avoidance o.f multiplicity
of suits is not enough" (p. 267).
In Farmers Co-op Oil Co. v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., (C.C.A. 8th; 1942) 133
F. (2d) 101, plaintiff on behalf of its members brought ac~ion to recover tnebie damages
under the provisions of the Clayton Act. This was held not a class suit, for,, while there
was a common question of law and fact, a common relief was not sou.ght; they in
reality were seeking to enforce causes of action which were several and damage.s would
•be different.
11 Where property was mortgaged to trustee to secure bonds, one owner on behalf
of himself and all other bond owners was allowed to obtain an injunction against the
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some specific, tangible fund or res. 12 Neither of these factors appears in the principal case.
William Houston

conveyanc~ of the property free from the mortgage by the trustee and mortgagor. Black
v. Elkhorn Coal Co., 233 Ky. 588, 26 S. W. (2d) 481 (1930).
Owners in severalty of water rights on a certain race were held to have such a
common or general interest respecting the invasion of their respective rights by the
wrongful act of a party in cutting off the common source that a few such owners
could seek an injunction for the benefit of all. Climax Specialty Co. v. Seneca Button
Co., 54 Misc. 152, 103 N.Y.S. 822 (1907).
Plaintiff, a member of a hairdressers' association, was allowed to sue in behalf of
himself and all other members to obtain a declaratory judgment that defendant's patent
was not infringed by any of the members. National Hairdressers' & C. Assn. v.
Philad Co., (D.C. Del., 1940) 34 F. Supp. 264.
Suit was allowed by a bondholder for himself and other holders to compel diking
commissioners to make further assessments and levies and to compel county treasurer
to collect unpaid taxes, in order to raise funds to pay off bonds. Perkins v. Diking Dist.
No. 3, 162 Wash. 227, 298 P. 462 (1931).
Action was permitted by a few holders of notes in behalf of themselves and all
other holders of notes in the same series to secure performance of an original contract
of security, to abrogate that which was done in fraud of their rights, and to appoint a
receiver. Pacific American Gasoline Co. v. Miller, (Tex. Civ. App., 1934) 76 S.W.
(2d) 833.
12 A suit by a group of members of an association was allowed against another
group of such members for an accounting by the latter group and pro rata division of
common property. Smith v. Swormstedt, 16 How. (57 U.S.)' 288 (1853).
Suit by a part of the bondholders to foreclose a trust deed. Baumann v. Harrison,
(D.C. App., Cal., 1941) 115 P. (2d) 531.
Suit by owners of a part of a series of bonds for repayment of diverted funds,
whjch were security for all the bonds, was permitted. Rollins v. Board of Drainage
Commissioners, 281 Ky. 771, 136 S.W. (2d) 1094 (1939).
A holder of a portion of the bonds secured by a deed of trust was allowed, in order
to protect the mortgaged property, to file a bill in his own behalf and, in behalf of all
others who owned bonds of that series, to enjoin the trustee's payment of a tax on the
property. Carter v. Rodewald, 108 Ill. 3 5 l ( l 884).
An action by a few of the creditors was allowed on behalf of themselves a~d all
other creditors of the same insolvent party to compel an accounting and distribution of
the assets in the hands of the assignee for the benefit of creditors. Kerr v. Blodgett,
48 N.Y. 62 (1871).

